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Whether or not courts impose an adequate level of punishment, is an important issue 
in terms of sustaining the social order, maintaining the judicial system's legitimacy, 
and designing anti-crime policies. To assess the level of sentencing the study surveyed 
longitudinally, the perspectives of Israeli judges on the issue over a period of three 
decades. The results show that, consistently, the judges assessed the level of punishment 
as quite lenient. The results also suggest that no corrective action was taken over the 
three decades to adjust for the lenient sentencing either by the court system or by the 
judges themselves, who have the discretion to impose more sever sentences. A regression 
analysis revealed that court instance and tenure as a judge were related to the judges' 
assessments of punishment. The practical and theoretical implications of all these 
results are discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do courts impose an adequate level of punishment? This is a crucial question 
for sustaining and legitimizing the criminal system, as well as a central issue 
in designing anti-crime policies. But, how can the adequacy of the level of 
punishment be assessed? Unfortunately, there is no acceptable empirical 
yardstick for the assessment of the general level of sentencing. Most 
empirical analyses of levels of punishment are based upon surveying public 
opinion. However, this approach is inadequate and unreliable.1 In the present 
paper, we examine the level of punishment from a different and unique point 
of view – that of the judges themselves. By introducing the judiciary's 
perspective and by empirically examining judges' assessments of the 
prevalent level of punishment, this paper contributes to the study and 
understanding of the level of punishment issued by the courts.  
The overall severity level of judicial punishment is a very important issue. 
Punishment is probably one of the most severe governmental interventions 
in human fundamental rights. It entails a wide range of sanctions, including 
                                                 
1 See discussion in section B.2. below. 
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deprivation of freedom by lengthy incarceration and, in extreme cases, even 
capital punishment. Thus, the adequacy of sentencing is of essential 
importance for sustaining the courts' societal legitimacy, for the welfare of 
society at large, and for the preservation of human rights. The proper 
sentencing level is also essential for the assessment of court effectiveness and 
is a key factor for upholding the public's trust in the court system. Therefore, 
there is a keen interest in studying the overall level of courts' punishment 
(severity or leniency).  
Previous studies have shown that the general public perceives sentencing 
levels as too lenient. However, while the public's perception of punishment 
is crucial for the courts' social legitimacy, it does not substitute the 
professional perspective of the legal branch as adequate feedback on the level 
of punishment for the courts. Thus, by focusing on public opinion, most 
current research has failed to shed light on the perspective of those 
professionals that are actually involved in the criminal punishment process 
such as judges and lawyers. There are few empirical studies on the perception 
of the key players in the sentencing process: the judges.2 Consequently, very 
little is known about how judges conceive and perceive the level of 
punishment that they themselves issue. Thus, exploring the judiciary's 
perceptions on the issue is of high importance, both from a theoretical and 
practical standpoint. This study is merely a step towards the exploration of 
this important issue, and it ought to be followed by further research. 
This study examines and analyses the perceptions of presiding Israeli trial 
court judges regarding the level of punishment that is most prevalent in 
                                                 
2 The few surveys examining judicial perceptions with regard to the level of sentencing 
are primarily 'experimental' in nature. Such an example is a sentencing experiment 
conducted in Dutch criminal courts, see, Jan W. De Keijser, Peter J. Van Koppen, 
and Henk Elffers, 'Bridging the gap between judges and the public? A multi-method 
study' [2007] Journal of Experimental Criminology 131-161. Similar experiments 
usually present the same scenario to a group of laypersons as well, and compare their 
resulting simulated sentences; see, Andre Kuhn, 'Public and judicial attitudes to 
punishment in Switzerland' in Julian V. Roberts (ed.), Changing Attitudes to 
Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and Justice (Routledge 2002), 117. See also, Austin 
Williams, Thomas Williams 'A Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated Legal 
Cases' [1977] 68 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 307. 
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Israel.3 The Israeli court system and, in particular, the criminal law are based 
on the common law system. The Israeli Penal Code and the specific offenses 
defined in it are based upon the English criminal law.4 Hence, the results of 
this study may help improve the understanding of the level of punishment in 
other common law jurisdictions as well.5  
                                                 
3 The Israeli judicial system has a three instance hierarchy – magistrate, district and 
supreme courts. The second instance (district court) serves as a trial court (first 
instance for matters that are beyond the jurisdiction boundaries of the first instance) 
and as a court of appeal, over the judgments of the first instance – the magistrate 
court. 
4 The Criminal Code Ordinance 1936 was enacted during the British mandate and was 
adopted by Israel upon its independence in 1948. In 1977, the code was replaced by 
the Israeli Penal Law 5737 - 1977. The new law followed the pattern of the English-
Mandatory Statute (in particular regarding the specific offenses). The Penal Law 
comprises two parts – general and a specific. The general part sets the basic principles 
of the criminal laws and provides the doctrines relating to criminal behavior. The 
specific part of the Penal Law details and defines the offenses ranging from 
infractions to the most serious crimes such as treason and murder. Following the 
common law pattern, offenses are divided into different categories as a function of 
the severity of the sanctions, and in particular, to the length of the maximum prison 
sentence per each crime. Hence, the Penal Code defines three categories of offenses: 
a) Infractions (petty crimes) – crimes that are subject to a maximum of three-month 
jail term. Jail terms from three months and up to three years are misdemeanors. 
Crimes that impose a prison sentence of more than three years or death penalty are 
defined as felonies. Generally, the Penal Law defines the elements of each particular 
offense: the criminal behavior (actus reus), and the required nature of intent (mens rea). 
The specific part also determines the particular sanctions regarding each offense. In 
addition to the Penal Law, other laws define numerous particular offenses such as the 
Securities Laws, Consumer Protection Laws, etc. 
5 The Israeli court system is an adversary one and is based upon the common law 
courts' principles. See for example, 'As for other nations' practices, looking first to a 
handful of common law countries whose judicial systems most closely resemble our 
own, specifically the United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel Mary L. Clark, 'Judges 
Judging Judicial Candidates: Should Currently Serving Judges Participate in Commissions 
to Screen and Recommend Article III Candidates Below the Supreme Court Level?' [2009] 
114 Penn. St. L. Rev. 49, 59; see also, 'United states and Israel share some features 
(they are both democracies with a common law tradition', Bruce Peabody, The Politics 
of Judicial Independence: Courts, Politics, and the Public (Johns Hopkings University 
Press 2011) 208-9. See also, 'courts based on the British derived common law 
adversarial system practiced in Israel', Angeline Lewis, Judicial Reconstruction and the 
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Typically, Israeli criminal laws prescribe a maximum penalty for defined 
offences (usually a maximum fine and/or maximum prison term). Only 
seldom does Israeli law impose mandatory6 or minimal7 jail penalties. 
Obviously, most crimes are not subject to the maximum penalty; this creates 
a legal vacuum that is being filled by judge-made law. Striving to facilitate 
achievement of the punitive goals, the Israeli Supreme Court has laid down 
very broad standards, requiring that punishment be based on the principles 
of 'deterrence, retribution, prevention, and rehabilitation'.8 These general 
principles confer upon the trial courts wide discretion, entailing very limited 
scope of appellate review.  
Throughout the period covered by this study (1989-2010/11), criminal 
sentencing laws were stable. The general part of the Penal Law, however, was 
revised in 1995. The revision granted courts limited discretion (in exceptional 
cases) to alleviate mandatory life-sentence penalties. However, as there are 
only a handful of such mandatory sanctions, and since the certain offenses 
and sanctions in the specific part were generally left unchanged, the impact 
of the revision on the general sentencing policy was limited.9 
Given the above, this study examines the following questions: 
What are the trial judges' perspectives on and assessment of the severity level 
of current courts sentencing? 
What are the judges' views of sentencing given a longitudinal perspective of 
almost three decades? 
Do judges' assessments of punishment relate to their individual 
                                                 
Rule of Law (Brill 2012) 96; Yoav Dotan, Lawyering for the Rule of Law: Government 
Lawyers and the Rise of Judicial Power in Israel (CUP 2013) 18ff. 
6 The Penal Code imposes mandatory life sentence in relation to murder crimes and 
genocide crimes. 
7 The Penal Code mandates a minimum imprisonment for assaulting police officers or 
obstruction to police officers while they carry out their duties. 
8 See, CA 3417/99 Har-Shefi v. State of Israel, section 9 of justice Tirkel's judgment, 
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/har-shefi-v-state-israel. 
9 A year or so after our research was completed a substantive reform in sentencing 
policy has been passed by the Israeli legislature. A structured sentencing regime 
replaced the previous judicial wide-discretion policy, Penal Law (amendment no. 113), 
2012, the amendment became effective as a law on 10.7.2013. 
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characteristics (such as court instance, tenure as judge, gender, etc.)? 
The underlying proposition is that the presiding judges will perceive the 
punishment they issue as well as that of and their colleagues as adequate. The 
present study examines this proposition empirically. 
The focus is on the judiciary as it plays a pivotal role in the sentencing process. 
Within statutory constraints, judges are the ones who decide on the actual 
penalties. Their role in the sentencing process requires the highest expertise 
and experience regarding sentencing policies and the prevalent levels of 
punishment. Judges have a comprehensive knowledge of penal law, 
procedure and sentencing principles, as well as familiarity with the particulars 
of the criminal cases. They are the ones who evaluate the facts, deliberate the 
legal issues, and take into account the special circumstances of the case in 
determining the appropriate punishment in each case. The judges' views on 
the level of punishment are therefore unique and of utmost importance and 
relevance. 
II. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON THE LEVEL OF PUNISHMENT  
Basic constitutional and human rights principles, as well as considerations of 
public legitimacy of courts,10 require that the level of criminal sentencing be 
just and adequate. Overly harsh penalties infringe upon the offenders' rights, 
and those too lenient penalties impinge on victims' rights and the need to 
protect society from criminal activities. The task of the courts is to properly 
set punishments within the sentencing ranges prescribed by the law. In so 
doing, courts serve the social ends of maintaining an optimal level of 
deterrence,11 as well as maximizing the welfare of society at large. 
                                                 
10 On the issues of level of sentencing and public confidence and trust in the judicial 
system, see: Julian V. Roberts, Mojca, M. Plesničar, 'Sentencing, Legitimacy, and 
Public Opinion'in Gorazd Meško and Justice Tankebe (eds.), Trust and Legitimacy in 
Criminal Justice 33-51 (Springer 2015), see also, Mike Hough, Ben Bradford, Jonathan 
Jackson, and Julian V. Roberts, Attitudes to Sentencing and Trust in Justice (2013). 
11 For a recent model of optimal deterrence, see Steven Shavell, 'A simple model of 
optimal deterrence and incapacitation', [2015] International Review of Law and 
Economics 13-19. See also, Nuno Garoupa, 'Economic Theory of Criminal 
Behavior'Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Springer 2014) 1280-1286. 
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Studying the perceptions of various sections of society regarding the level of 
punishment has important social implications. For example, a prevalent 
conception among the public is that the level of punishment, regardless of its 
real effects, may affect the degree of legal compliance, and consequently, 
affect the crime rates in society. Thus, a public perception that sentencing 
has been overly lenient may contribute to a increase in crime and have 
negative consequences for social welfare.  
1. Studies on Public Opinion  
The most common approach for assessing the perception of the level of 
sentencing has been through surveying public opinion.12 The most prevalent 
methods used to gauge the public's opinion on sentencing are public opinion 
polls, media polls, focus groups, etc.13 In the last decades, several public 
opinion surveys have been conducted assessing the prevalent levels of 
punishment in various countries.14 The findings suggest that, in many 
                                                 
12 Another, more 'objective' method for evaluating the severity of sentencing is to 
compare actual sentences to various statistical parameters. For instance, to compare 
the average (or median) number of years of the actual sentencing to the 'average' range 
prescribed by law. The difference (if any) between them can suggest the severity or 
leniency of the actual punishment and gage skewedness, proportions etc. See, for 
example: Oren Gazal-Ayal, Ruth Kannai, 'Determination of Starting Sentences in 
Israel-System and Application' [2010] Federal Sentencing Reporter 232-242. 
However, such calculations, in the context of the adequate level of sentencing, are 
usually meaningless, since they do not relate to accepted criteria of adequate 
punishment. 
13 Arie Freiberg, Karen Gelb, Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy 
(Routledge 2014) 69-70. 
14 See for example: Mike Hough, Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson, and Julian V. 
Roberts 'Attitudes to Sentencing and Trust in Justice: Exploring Trends from the 
Crime Survey for England and Wales' (LSE Report, 2013); Julian V. Roberts, 'Public 
Opinion and the Nature of Community Penalties: International Findings'In Julian 
V. Roberts and Mike Hough (eds.) Changing Attitudes to Punishment (Routledge 2002) 
33; Austin Lovegrove, 'Sentencing and Public Opinion: An Empirical Study of 
Punitiveness and Lenience and its Implications for Penal Moderation' (2013) 46 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 200-220. Kimberly N. Varma, 
Voula Marinos. 'Three Decades of Public Attitudes Research on Crime and 
Punishment in Canada' (2013) 55 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 549-562. Julian V. Roberts, Mike Hough. 'Exploring public attitudes to 
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countries, the public views the courts' sentencing as lenient or as highly 
lenient.15 Only a small proportion of respondents perceived punishments as 
severe. For example, Hough and Roberts reported that their survey of the 
British public regarding the level of punishment showed that about four-
fifths of the public in the UK perceived the level of punishment as lenient.16 
Half (51 percent) evaluated the level of punishment as much too lenient. Only 
a minority (19 percent) estimated the level of punishment as appropriate, and 
just 3 percent of them perceived it as too severe. In other words, the 
overwhelming majority of the public considered the punishment to be 
lenient. The British Annual Survey, which examined the attitudes of the 
public in relation to the level of sentencing, showed similar results (Table 1 
below). 
  
                                                 
sentencing, factors in England and Wales' in Julian V Roberts (ed.), Mitigation and 
Aggravation at Sentencing (CUP 2011) 168; Mike Hough, Julian V. Roberts. 
'Sentencing trends in Britain Public knowledge and public opinion' (1999) 1 
Punishment & Society 11-26. 
15 Ryan Kornhauser, 'Economic individualism and punitive attitudes: A cross-national 
analysis' (2015) 17 Punishment & Society 27-53; 'One of the leitmotifs of public 
attitudes to criminal justice is the desire for a harsher response to crime. Most people 
believe that the justice system is too lenient towards offenders. This perception goes 
back for many years.' Julian V. Roberts, Michael Hough, Understanding Public attitude 
to Criminal Justice (Open University Press 2005) 13; 'For decades the responses have 
been the same: most people believe that judges are too lenient towards offenders. 
This widespread dissatisfaction with the severity of sentencing is probably the most 
replicated finding in the field', ibid, 76. 
16 Michael Hough, Julian Roberts, 'Attitudes to Punishment: Findings from the British 
Crime Survey' [1998] Home Office Research Study 179, 28, http://www.icpr.org.uk/ 
media/10372/Attitudes%20to%20punishment,%20hors179.pdf accessed 15 
September 2015. 
This attitude remained stable for a long time, see, William Dawes, et. al, 'Attitudes 
to Guilty Plea Sentence Reductions' (Sentencing Council 2011) Ch. 2 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sentencingcouncil.org.
uk%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2FAttitudes_to_Guilty_Plea_Sentence_Reduction
s_web1.pdf accessed 15 September 2015. 
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Table 1: Attitudes toward sentence severity (2008/09 to 2010/11)17 
 
It is also worthwhile to note that this perception of leniency is constant and 
consistent over three years. Hough and Roberts concluded: 
This widespread dissatisfaction with the severity of sentencing is probably 
the most replicated finding in the field. It appears that whenever (and 
wherever) the public had been asked the question the majority responded in 
this way.18 
Similar results of the perceived leniency have been also reported in other 
common-law countries as well as in some civil law countries,19 and even in the 
Nordic countries.20 Typical results of surveys in those countries show that 
the punishment is perceived as lenient, with only a minority of respondents 
perceiving the level of punishment as appropriate, and significantly fewer 
                                                 
17 Michael Hough, Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson, Julian V. Roberts 'Attitudes to 
Sentencing and Trust in Justice'(2013).23, Table 3/6, https://docs.google.com/ 
viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.bbk.ac.uk%2F5195%2F1%2F5195.pdf accessed 
15 September 2015; See also, Jane B. Sprott, Cheryl Marie Webster, and Anthony N. 
Doob. 'Punishment Severity and Confidence in the Criminal Justice System' (2013) 55 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 279-292. 
18 Julian V. Roberts, Michael Hough, Understanding Public Attitudes to Criminal Justice 
(Open University Press 2005) 76. 
19 Helmut Kury, Joachim Obergfell-Fuchs, and Ulrich Smartt, 'The Evolution of Public 
Attitudes to Punishment in Western and Eastern Europe' in Julian V. Roberts, 
Michael Hough (eds), Changing Attitudes to Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and 
Justice (2005) 93-114. 
20 Balvig Flemming, Helgi Gunnlaugsson, Kristina Jerre, Henrik Tham, and Aarne 
Kinnunen, 'The Public Sense of Justice in Scandinavia: A Study of Attitudes towards 
Punishments' (2015) 12 European Journal of Criminology 342-361. 
 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09 
Much too tough ‹1% 1% 1% 
A little too tough  2% 2% 2% 
About right 24% 22% 21% 
A little too lenient 36% 35% 35% 
Much too lenient 38% 40% 41% 
Un-weighted N 
(=100%) 
5,596 5,389 5,572 
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respondents seeing the punishment as severe. In the United States, for 
example, public opinion surveys indicate that the public wishes the courts 
would deal more severe punishment than is currently being imposed.21 
Some studies have indicated that there is a gap between the public's 
perception of punishment leniency and its perception of a 'proper 
punishment'. In these studies, respondents were asked to suggest 
appropriate penalties to hypothetical cases (which were based on real cases 
already determined by the court). The respondents typically suggested a 
harsher punishment than that actually imposed by the court. Such results 
raise a question of the value of public opinion polls for determining the level 
of punishment.22  
Very few surveys were conducted in Israel on the perceived severity of 
sentencing. The surveys that have been undertaken indicate that the public's 
attitude is that punishment of offenders is too lenient. A recent poll, 
surveying a representative sample of the Jewish population in Israel, showed 
that the majority (70 percent) of the respondents thought that sentencing 
had been too lenient. Only 10 percent estimated punishment as too severe.23 
Another survey, which focused on offenses against children, also illustrated 
that the public regards sentencing for such offenses as being too lenient.24 
                                                 
21 Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher and Brandon K. Applegate, 'Public Opinion about 
Punishment and Corrections' (2000) 58 Crime and Justice 1-79, 27: 'the public prefers 
or, at very least, accepts policies that get tough with the offenders'. 
22 Jan W. De Keijser, Peter J. Van Koppen, and Henk Elffers, 'Bridging the Gap 
between Judges and the Public? A Multi-Method Study' (2007) 3 Journal of 
Experimental Criminology 131-161. See also, Martina Feilzer, 'Exploring Public 
Knowledge of Sentencing Practices' in Julian V. Roberts (ed.), Exploring Sentencing 
Practice in England and Wales (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 61. 
23 http://www.themarker.com/law/1.1707669 accessed 15 September 2015, in Hebrew) 
24 Schmidt Hillel Benbenishty Rami, 'Public Attitudes toward Child Maltreatment in 
Israel' [2011] 33 Children and Youth Services Review 1181-1188. For the full report in 
Hebrew see: 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.haruv.org.il%2F_Uploa
ds%2FdbsAttachedFiles%2Farticlesemail.pdf accessed 15 September 2015. 
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2. Criticism of Public Opinion Studies on Sentencing 
Public opinion surveys have been criticized as an unreliable method of 
analysis of the level of punishment. While polls may reflect the perception of 
the public, critics of the approach claim that the general public is incapable 
of providing a proper assessment of the level of sentencing. They assert that 
given the complex nature of the sentencing processes, laypeople do not have 
the capability or skills to accurately grasp legal processes and, hence, cannot 
provide a proper assessment.25 Several reasons for this have been noted: 
A. Incomplete Information 
The central criticisms of public opinion polls as providing poor reflection on 
punishment levels are twofold: 
1) Legal knowledge – The public lacks the knowledge and (legal) 
understanding required for a relevant and educated assessment  
of the case; 
2) Distorted knowledge – Incomplete information and at times 
misinformation is common among the public. 
According to critics, public opinion surveys are not an appropriate proxy for 
gauging the severity of existing punishment as the public does not have the 
knowledge and legal understanding required for properly evaluating the level 
of punishment. Furthermore, the public does not have access to the 
particular details of the cases that are of the essence in determining the 
sentences.26 Criticism of the use of public opinion surveys has intensified in 
the recent years making 'a very strong case against the validity of survey 
measurements of public opinion on criminal justice'.27 The current view in 
criminology literature is that public opinion may be relied upon only when 
the public is provided with sufficient information and is reasonably able to 
                                                 
25 See, Julian V. Roberts, Mojca M. Plesničar 'Sentencing, Legitimacy, and Public 
Opinion' [2015] Trust and Legitimacy in Criminal Justice 33, 43 and reference. 
26 See, Neil Hutton, 'Beyond Populist Punitiveness' (2005) 7 Punishment and Society 
243. 
27 Jan W. de Keijser, Henk Elffers 'Cross-jurisdictional differences in punitive public 
attitudes?' (2009) 15 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 47-62, 49. 
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deliberate the questions.28 But in most surveys, this is not the case. Hence, 
serious doubts have been raised about the validity of public opinion surveys 
as a dependable or even as a proper means for assessing the levels of 
punishment in a society. Yet, such polls remain the most common tool for 
assessing levels of punishment and they still have a significant impact on 
politician, administrators and others. This may affect future levels of 
punishment and establish an 'unjustified and unhealthy level of dominance in 
the contemporary political sphere'.29 
As for the problem of distorted and incomplete information, critics have 
argued that the opinions and perceptions of the public are derived from 
anecdotal, sporadic, partial, distorted, and/or erroneous information. Hence, 
the perspective of the public is inaccurate and biased. For the most part, the 
information available to the public tends to be derived from the mass media,30 
which typically focuses on the exceptional, unusual, otherwise sensational, or 
even inflammatory cases rather than the usual, ordinary court rulings. 
Consequently, people who are exposed to such media are more likely to 
consider punishments as too lenient and tend to advocate harsher punitive 
                                                 
28 David A. Green, 'Public Opinion versus Public Judgment about Crime Correcting 
the 'Comedy of Errors'' (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 131-154. Julian V. 
Roberts, "'Community views of sentencing: Intuitive and principled responses to 
offending' in Michael Tonry (ed.), Punishment Futures. Studies in Penal Theory and 
Philosophy(OUP 2011) ; see also, Julian V. Roberts, 'Clarifying the Significance of 
Public Opinion for Sentencing Policy and Practice' in Ryberg, Jesper, and Julian V. 
Roberts (eds.) Popular Punishment: On the Normative Significance of Public Opinion 
(OUP 2014) 228. Jan W. de Keijser, 'Penal Theory and Popular opinion: The 
Deficiencies of Direct Engagement' in Ryberg, Jesper, and Julian V. Roberts (eds), 
Popular Punishment: on the normative significance of public opinion (OUP 2014) 101, 104ff. 
29 Liz Turner, 'Penal Populism, Deliberative Methods, and the Production of 'Public 
Opinion' on Crime and Punishment' (2014) 23 The Good Society 87-102. See also, 
Matthew Smith, 'The Chicken or the Egg: What Shapes Public Opinion on 
Punishment?' [2013] Chicago Policy Review http://chicagopolicyreview.org 
/2013/10/08/the-chicken-or-the-egg-what-shapes-public-opinion-on-punishment/ 
accessed March 11 2017. It argues that public opinion has caused stricter punishment.  
30 On the implication of the media upon respondents in public polls see, Julian V. 
Roberts et al, Penal Populism and Public Opinion: Lessons from Five Countries (OUP 
2002) ch. 5.  
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measures compared to people with less media exposure.31 Furthermore, less 
knowledgeable people rely more heavily on the media's interpretations as a 
source of information.32 
Several scholars have referred to this issue as the 'punitive gap' - the gap 
between the public's attitudes on sentencing and the actual sentencing.33 This 
gap is attributed in part to the lack of accurate and valid information. In 
general, the public lacks knowledge and understanding of criminal law and 
sentencing policy.34 Consequently, the public is incapable of analyzing what 
information is relevant and form an educated opinion. Various studies have 
shown that providing laypeople with relevant case information, even as trivial 
as the range of the statutory sentencing penalties or sentencing alternatives, 
have changed the respondents' perceptions on severity.35 Furthermore, 
studies have shown that additional information affects respondents' views on 
punishment levels.36 Such information make respondents more 
                                                 
31 Franklin D. Gilliam, Shanto Iyengar, 'Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local 
Television News on the Viewing Public' (2000) 44 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 560, 563-64. 
32 Justin T Pickett, Christina Mancini, Daniel P. Mears, and Marc Gertz, 'Public (Mis) 
Understanding of Crime Policy the Effects of Criminal Justice Experience and Media 
Reliance' [2015] Criminal Justice Policy Review 500-522. Kenneth Dowler, 'Media 
Consumption and Public Attitudes toward Crime and Justice: The Relationship 
between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police Effectiveness' 
(2003) 10 J. Crim. Justice Popular Culture 109; see also Julian V. Roberts & Anthony 
N. Doob, 'News Media Influences on Public Views of Sentencing' (1990) 14 L. & 
Hum. Behav. 451, 456. 
33 Jan W. de Keijser, Henk Elffers, 'Cross-jurisdictional differences in punitive public 
attitudes?' (2009)15 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 47-62, 48ff 
and references there. 
34 At an early stage of the empirical studies of the perceptions of punishment, scholars 
noticed that there was a substantial gap between the actual levels of punishment and 
the public's perception of the sentencing; See, Arnold M. Rose, Arthur E. Prell, 'Does 
the punishment fit the crime? A Study in Social Valuation' [1955] American Journal 
of Sociology 247-259, 248. 
35 Julian V. Roberts et al, Penal Populism and Public Opinion: Lessons from Five Countries 
(2005) 29-31 and references to studies there. 
36 David Indermaur, Lynne Roberts, Caroline Spiranovic, Geraldine Mackenzie, and 
Karen Gelb, 'A matter of judgement: The effect of information and deliberation on 
public attitudes to punishment' (2012) 14 Punishment & Society 147-165. 
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knowledgeable and decrease the 'punitive-gap' in their perceptions of 
pensiveness.37  
To recapitulate, assessments by the public of the level of punishment are, in 
fact, imprecise impressions based on partial, selective, and even inaccurate 
information. Some studies show that the public has no meaningful knowledge 
on the actual level of punishment.38 Scholarly criticism has asserted that 
public opinions on this issue are unreliable and cannot reflect whether 
punishment is actually39 too lenient or harsh.40  
B. The Complexity of Criminal Sentencing 
Criminal sentencing is a process of balancing. On one hand, there are 
elements specific to each case and each offender and, on the other hand, there 
are public interest and the structure of the statutes. This creates inherent 
difficulties in having non-professionals assess the level of sentencing. The 
regular structure of criminal statutes prescribes the maximum and the 
minimum penalty, and sometimes prescribes no substantial punishment. 
Judges determine a particular punishment following judicial guidelines and 
personal discretion. These particular punishments result in a disparity among 
penalties imposed upon offenders for the breach of the same statutory 
                                                 
37 Arie Freiberg, Karen Gelb, Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy 
(Routledge 2014) 74-76 and references there. 
38 See for example, Michael Hough, Julian V. Roberts, 'Sentencing Trends in Britain: 
Public Knowledge and Public Opinion' (1999) 1 Punishment and Society 11-26, 20. See 
also, Trevor Sanders, Julian V. Roberts, 'Public Attitudes Toward Conditional 
Sentencing: Results of a National Survey' (2000) 32 Canadian Journal of Behavioral 
Science 199-207. 
39 Jesper Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts, Popular Punishment: On the Normative Significance of 
Public Opinion (OUP 2014) 5. 
40 This, however, does not imply that public opinion surveys are irrelevant. 
Understanding public perception of punishment is of importance because it may 
actually influence the behavior of the stakeholders such as potential offenders, 
lawyers etc. Hence, notwithstanding the real level of punishment, a perception of 
harsher punishment may deter people from performing socially negative activities, 
while a public perception of leniency may fail in achieving sufficient deterrence and 
consequently result in higher rates of criminal activities. In addition, other 
ramifications may result from the publics' perceptions of punishment such as 
people's attitudes to fairness and justice. 
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criminal rule. The inherent variability of punishments is often viewed by non-
professionals as inconsistency. Non-professionals tend to view as lenient 
penalties that are inconsistent with the more sever ones in the range, and this 
reinforces their perceptions on severity of punishment. A layman's 
perception, therefore, is of questionable value in assessing overall levels of 
punishment. In contrast, professionally qualified evaluators, such as judges or 
lawyers, assess such diversity differently and make a much better (or, at least 
a less distorted) estimation of the appropriate level of punishment. As 
indicated earlier, there are very few empirical studies of views expressed by 
judges or representatives of the legal professions (such as lawyers). 
Consequently, the primary source of evaluation of the level of punishment is 
currently based upon the not very reliable grounds of opinion surveys of 
attitudes of the general public, or segments of it.  
C. Limited Accessibility for Research 
The focus on public opinion rather than on judges' perceptions may be a 
result of the practical and legal difficulties of conducting surveys among 
judges.41. This is particularly the case when the subject matter of the research 
may, directly or indirectly, be seen as a criticism of the judicial system. 
Furthermore, judges are frequently overloaded with work,42 and their 
predisposition to participate in independent academic studies is low. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find only a handful of systematic empirical 
studies of the judges' views regarding punishment.43  
                                                 
41 To run our surveys, we had to obtain permission from the Chief Justice of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, who is considered the head of the judicial system. 
42 See for example, Shay Lavie, 'Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure' (2016) 27 Stan. 
L. & Policy Rev. 57; Andrew Tickell, 'More 'efficient' justice at the European Court 
of Human Rights: but at whose expense?' [2015] Public Law, 206; Roger J. Miner, 
'Dealing with the Appellate Caseload Crisis: The Report of the Federal Courts Study 
Committee Revisited' (2013) 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 517; Michael C. Gizzi, 'Examining 
the Crisis of Volume in the U.S. Courts of Appeals' (1993) 77 Judicature 96. 
43 Searching the legal data bases show that, indeed, a small number of surveys of judges' 
perceptions and attitudes were published, but none dealt with the subject of severity 
of the level of punishment. 
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III. JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS – FINDINGS 
Our study examined the perceptions on punishment by presiding judges in 
Israel over a period of nearly 30 years.44 Three consecutive surveys were 
conducted, 10 years apart, among all the first and second-instance judges 
presiding at the time of the surveys: in 1989, 1999 and 2010.45 In the three 
surveys, the judges were asked to assess the severity level of the punishment 
prevalent at the time of each survey.46 The very same question was used in all 
three surveys in order to allow a direct comparison. To avoid a self-serving 
response bias, the judges were not asked to assess their own sentencing but 
to assess the level of sentencing severity prevailing in Israel at the time. 
The question the judges were asked in all three surveys was: 'Given your 
familiarity with the Israeli courts system, to what extent do the sentences imposed by 
the courts reflect a lenient approach?'.47 The response range to this question was: 
1. not lenient at all; 2. lenient to a small extent; 3. partly lenient; 4. considerably lenient; 
5. lenient to a large extent; 6. very lenient.48 
                                                 
44 Even though the data was collected in Israel, the results may have ramifications for a 
wider scope of common law judicial systems, of which the Israeli system is part. 
45 For a detailed description of the research methods and surveys conducted, see 
Appendix A. 
46 We acknowledge the possibility of a 'pro-system' bias in judges' assessments of 
punishment, as their responses may 'tarnish' the reputation of the judicial system and 
of their colleagues, and perhaps indirectly also implicate themselves. Therefore, the 
answers of the judges may be biased. If such bias exists, the result will be that the 
assessment of the punishment level would be that it is more 'appropriate' than it 
actually is. Consequently, the answers here are perhaps even more 'restrained' than 
the real opinion is. 
47 What is meant by 'lenient' was not pre-defined for the judges, but was left for the 
assessment of the responding judge. For a full discussion of this point, see Appendix 
A: Research Methods.  
48 An exploratory study conducted prior to the survey included the categories of 
'adequate' and 'too harsh'. Yet it was found that no one chose these responses, and they 
remained 'empty categories'. Hence, they were omitted from the survey. For further 
details regarding the choice of this kind of response range, see Appendix A: Research 
Methods. 
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1. Judges' Assessment of the Prevalent Punishment Level 
In the presentation of our results, we will first analyze the findings of the 
most current survey, conducted in 2010, and then compare them to those 
attained a decade and two decades earlier. 
Our assertion was that since judges are the ones who issue the sentences and 
decide on the punishment they consider most appropriate, they would assess 
the level of punishment as fitting and appropriate and not as lenient. The 
findings did not support this assertion (See Chart 1 below). They showed that 
most judges did not consider the level of punishment to be appropriate. The 
majority of them (70 percent) considered punishment to reflect a lenient or 
at least partly lenient approach. Only very few judges (8 percent) considered 
the level of punishment to be not lenient at all. 
Over a third of the judges (36 percent) thought that the punishments handed 
out were considerably to very lenient, of whom nine percent evaluated the 
punishments as lenient to a large and a very large extent. Another third (34 
percent) said the existing punishment was partly lenient and 23 percent said 
it was lenient to a small extent (Chart 1 below). 
In other words, even though the judges are the ones who issue the sentences 
and decide on the punishment, a large majority of them thought that the 
courts' sentences reflected some level of leniency. We find these results quite 
surprising. It is commonly assumed that judges are using their best judgment 
to decide and determine the punishment they think is the most appropriate 
one given the merits of the specific case. Yet, the results here suggested that 
the judges did not have confidence in the judgment of their colleagues; rather, 
they regarded the colleagues' sentencing as unfitting and lenient. 
These results also raise an interesting issue: if most judges think that the 
overall level of punishment tends toward leniency, why do they not adjust it 
by issuing more adequate i.e., less lenient punishments? After all, it is up to 
them to decide and in their power to implement it.  
Before we engage in finding possible interpretations for these results, it ought 
to be examined if the results obtained here are not an aberration. Perhaps the 
severity level of punishment found in 2010 reflected a temporary one-time 
deviation from the appropriate level. In other words, the level of punishment 
may follow a pattern of 'dynamic equilibrium'. Like any other 'open system', 
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the level of punishment is not unwavering or consistently stable, but it 
fluctuates or oscillates over time around a certain average level: i.e., governed 
by homeostasis.49 In other words, when the level of punishment becomes 
more lenient than expected, judges may adjust by imposing more severe 
punishments to 'compensate' and correct for it. This 'correction' or 
adjustment may oscillate to a level of overly severe punishments, which in 
turn will lead to a further 'correction' toward higher leniency, to adjust 
accordingly, and so on. To wit, over time, the level of punishment may 
constantly fluctuate between too lenient or too severe, depicting a 'dynamic 
equilibrium' around the adequate punishment. Hence, it may well be that the 
judges' evaluation of the level of punishment in the 2010 survey was a 'snap-
shot' at a single point in time and not a dynamic picture of the levels of 
punishment that oscillate toward leniency as a reaction to a prior period when 
the perception of severity was much higher. To test this interpretation, a 
longitudinal perspective will be taken. 
2. A Longitudinal Comparison 
In order to test the above interpretation, we examined the perceived level of 
punishment over an extended time period. As noted above, judges' 
assessments of the level of punishment were measured not only in 2010, but 
also one decade earlier (1999) and two decades (1989) earlier. Given the 
conceptual framework of 'dynamic equilibrium' (or homeostasis), the 
perception of punishment as lenient may be a 'response' to a perceived severe 
level of punishment in the preceding decade (1999) and a 'correction' for it. If 
this is so, the level of punishment as perceived by judges in 1999 can be 
expected to be more severe, or in terms of our study, as 'not lenient at all'. The 
same pattern may be assumed for the judges' assessments given two decades 
earlier, in 1989.50 The responses given at the three points in time are 
compared below (Chart 1). 
  
                                                 
49 'Homeostasis' is a mechanism inherent within open systems to assure that deviations 
beyond a given range from their desired course of affairs are self-corrected, thus 
assuring the systems' survival and sustainability. 
50 Obviously, there is the question of what is the proper time-cycle that captures the 
oscillation cycle. We refer to this issue later. 
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Chart 1: Judges' assessment of level of punishment over three decades (in %) 
 
 
Looking at the data of the 1999 survey first, the results do not appear to 
support the 'self-correction' (homeostasis) assertion. In the 1999 survey, the 
assessments of punishment level, in general, were found to be no different 
than those in 2010 (Chart 1). The observed differences between them were 
not statistically significant, suggesting that the two distributions of responses 
of 2010 and of 1999 – are practically the same.51 To wit, the judges' 
perceptions of the punishment level in 1999 pointed towards leniency with 
the same strength as in 2010. 
While these differences in distributions were not statistically different, in 
1999, a somewhat larger majority of the judges (80 percent vs. 70 percent in 
2010) said that the punishment prevalent at the time reflected leniency to at 
least some extent. More specifically, in 1999, a quarter (24 percent) of the 
judges said that the punishments were very lenient, as opposed to only 9 
percent who suggested that in 2010.52 Similarly in 1999, 42 percent of the 
                                                 
51 χ2= 6 .51, d.f.= 8, (p>0.10) n.s. 
52 The value of statistical significance is affected by the number of observations at hand. 
Since the number of judges here is rather small this may affect the calculated 
significance of the differences. Perhaps with a larger N the differences could turn out 
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judges assessed the punishment to be lenient 'to a large extent' or 'very 
lenient', whereas in 2010, 36 percent of the judges thought so. At the other 
end of the scale, in 1999 only 20 percent of the judges thought punishments 
were 'not at all lenient' or lenient 'to a small extent only', as opposed to 31 
percent of the judges who felt this way in 2010. 
These results suggest that the perceived leniency of punishment in 2010 was 
not a reaction to the perceived level of punishment during the preceding 
decade. The assertion, thus, that self-correction mechanisms are at work here 
(homeostasis) is not supported. However, since we have no precise 
knowledge of the timespan of the oscillating cycle (if one indeed exists), 
homeostasis cannot be ruled out entirely. It can still be argued that the 
correction or adjustment cycle takes less (or perhaps more) than a decade, or 
that we have 'missed' its picks with our surveys, and hence it was not captured 
by the surveys conducted 10 years apart. We have no data to clearly rule out 
such an argument. 
It can, however, be assumed that adjustment periods, or oscillation cycles, 
from lenient to harsh punishment and back are not 'instantaneous' and may 
take several years to occur. Similarly, it may take judges several years of 
experiencing 'inappropriate' levels of punishment to react accordingly and 
adjust their own sentencing (if at all). Thus, we suggest that comparing the 
judges' responses at two points in time may miss or fail to reflect the 'full' 
cycle of oscillation from lenient punishment. Therefore, we added to the 
analysis the responses of the judges to this question collected in the 1989 
survey. Now, the pattern of perceived level of punishment can be examined 
over three points in time.  
The 1989 results remained basically the same – the distribution of responses 
was not statistically significant from those of two preceding surveys.53 The 
majority of the judges in the 1989 survey thought that punishment was at least 
'partly lenient', and a minority said it was only slightly lenient or not at all 
lenient (Chart 1). More specifically, in the 1989 survey, 63 percent of the 
judges believed that punishments were at least partly lenient, and among this 
number, 27 percent said the punishment was considerably lenient, and 12 
percent felt it was lenient to a large extent or very lenient. Over a third 
                                                 
53 χ2= 6.51, d.f.= 8, p> 0.10; N.S. 
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assessed the punishment as lenient only to a small extent (27 percent) or not 
lenient at all (10 percent). 
Thus, adding the data of 1989 to that of the other surveys shows that the 
distributions of judges' assessments over the three decades were not 
statistically different from each other. They all similarly suggested that 
punishment was persistently perceived not to be adequate but to be quite 
lenient. Also, these results did not support the assertion regarding 
homeostasis. There appears to be no self-correction (no homeostasis) 
mechanism, and the lenient approach in punishment prevailed over the 
rather long time period of three decades. 
However, as suggested earlier, one can still not rule out the argument that the 
cycle of fluctuations, if they existed, did not fully correspond with our 
surveys. Since the timespan of such a proposed cycle is unknown, there is the 
possibility that it occurs within each decade and the three points of 
measurement here actually tapped it at the very same status: namely, a peak 
of leniency. While we think, it is rather unlikely that all three surveys 
happened to 'miss' the cycle, our data is not sufficient for ruling out such an 
event. From the statistical point of view, however, all three distributions, 
while not identical, were not significantly different. 
The presentation of the responses in Chart 1, even though not statistically 
significant, can be interpreted as reflecting some level of oscillations of 
decreasing and increasing leniency over the three periods of time. For 
example, if one examines the responses judges gave in the 1989 survey, 37 
percent of them said that punishment was not at all (or almost not) lenient; in 
1999 their proportion was reduced to 20 percent, and in 2010, it increased 
again to 31 percent. Perhaps more pronounced were the differences in 
proportion of judges who felt the punishment was very lenient or lenient to a 
large extent: 12 percent in 1989 growing to 24 percent in 1999 and dropping 
back to 9 percent in 2010. In other words, several judges felt that the level of 
punishment was less lenient in 1989, became more lenient in 1999 and less 
lenient again in 2010. Thus, the mechanisms of homeostasis or self-
adjustment arguable does exist, correcting the 1989 deviations towards 
somewhat higher leniency in the level of punishment in 1999, and oscillating 
it back towards the less lenient level in 2010. Yet, as these observed 
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differences in responses are not statistically significant54 the assertion about 
a self-correcting mechanism that operates over time in punishments handed 
out is not supported here. 
Given all of the above, we adopt the position that the judges' perception of 
the level of punishment did not significantly change over the three decades, 
and that they had been assessing it as lenient all along. We find this 
consistency in judges' perceptions over such an extended period quite 
surprising. 
IV. JUDGES' BACKGROUND AND THE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF 
PUNISHMENT 
The analyses above indicate that the judges' assessments of the levels of 
punishment were not uniform and not all of them evaluated them in the same 
manner. Do these different views relate to some professional background 
factors such as their years of experience, the court they sit on, their 
employment prior to their appointment to the bench, or perhaps personal 
factors such as their gender? 
Courts,55 as well as scholars,56 have recognized that a judge's background may 
affect their decisions. This is particularly true in cases where judges have a 
wide discretion in sentencing.57 We examined some of these possible 
                                                 
54 The commonly acceptable probability of error is 0.05% or less, and the probability of 
error found here is higher than that. Furthermore, when the population at hand if 
rather small (as the numbers of judges here), a less strict criterion of p<0.10% may 
also be used, but the results reported above (p>0.10) did not meet this lax criterion 
either. 
55 As Judge Richard A. Posner recognized: '[T]he exercise of discretion is shaped by a 
judge's values and intuitions, which in turn are shaped by the judge's background and 
experiences', Tyson v. Trigg 50 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir.1995). 
56 See for example, Paula M. Kautt, Cassia C. Spohn, 'Assessing Blameworthiness and 
Assigning Punishment', in Edward R. Maguire, David E. Duffee (eds), Criminal Justice 
Theory: Explaining the Nature and Behavior of Criminal Justice (Routledge 2015) 220-221. 
57 See for example, 'Although a sentencing judge is bound to make the findings and 
consider the relevant factors as required by the sentencing law, the manner in which 
a judge performs these duties may be guided by that judge's background, experiences, 
and moral values', State v. Brown, Court of Appeals of Ohio, 2004 WL 764589. 
2017} Judges' Perspective on the Level of Punishment… 193 
 
relationships by analyzing the data collected in the most recent survey of 
2011, where the number of respondents was the greatest (86 judges).58 
1. Judges' Assessments of Punishment by their Court Instance 
The assessment of the level of punishment may differ by court instance. The 
first instance (Court-of-Peace) in Israel generally adjudicates the crimes that 
entail imprisonment of up to a maximum of seven years, while the second 
instance (District Court) has jurisdiction on felonies that are subject to 
maximum imprisonment exceeding seven years. The gravity of the crimes 
adjudicated by each instance may reflect in a different perspective on 
punishment. Moreover, Israeli second instance courts have a twofold 
jurisdiction in criminal proceedings: they serve as trial courts within the 
scope of their vested jurisdiction and also as appellate courts that review first 
instance judgments. Hence, they have the formal authority and practical 
experience to evaluate the adequacy of the decisions and sentences of the 
lower instance courts. This special jurisdictional structure may affect the 
perception of the level of magistrate (First Instance) judges. 
In order to examine such possible effect, the judges were divided as first and 
second instance, and the distributions of their assessments were compared. 
The results showed the distributions of responses of judges of the two 
instances were not different from each other or statistically significant.59 
Thus, no difference in perceptions of punishment severity exists between 
first and second instance judges. 
2. Judges' Assessments of Punishment Based on Tenure 
We further tested if the tenure of a judge could explain difference in 
perception of leniency. We expected that the more experienced the judge (as 
measured by years as a judge) the more he or she would assess punishments as 
lenient. Not only do years on the bench provide a wider perspective on 
punishment, longer experience allows for a different perspective on 
recidivism. To test this, years spent as a judge were correlated with the judges' 
assessment of level of punishment. The results show the two were correlated 
                                                 
58 See Appendix A: Research methods, for details. 
59 Differences are not significant: χ2=3.4, d.f.=4; p= 0.46, n.s. 
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(rp= 0.25) with each other.60 The proposition is therefore supported: the more 
experience judges have, the more they tend to assess punishment as lenient. 
However, the correlation found here is not a strong one, suggesting that 
judges' experience is only weakly related to their assessments of punishment. 
However, the correlation coefficient used here (Pearson's coefficient) taps 
linear relationships only. But, the relationships between years of tenure and 
assessment of punishment may be non-linear in nature. In fact, the Pearson 
coefficient indicates whether relationships between two variables were linear 
or not. Thus, if the relationships between years of experience and views on 
punishment are non-linear, the coefficient may be weak or indicate no 
relationship altogether. To examine if this is the case here, the relationship 
between punishment assessment and tenure were also examined using cross-
tabulation of the two variables. In order to accomplish this, the variable of 
years of tenure as a judge was clustered into three categories61:  
a. short experience (0-7 years); b. intermediate experience (8-14 years); c. long 
experience (over 14 years). The categories of 'very high' and 'high' extent of 
leniency assessment were also collapsed together.62 The distributions were 
then cross-tabulated (Table 2). 






The results (Table 2) show that the relationships between tenure and 
assessment of leniency are, indeed, not quite linear. While there were 
                                                 
60 Pearson correlation coefficient (rp) was calculated here: rp= 0.25, p< 0.04 (N=69). 
61 Given the relatively small number of judges in the sample (see appendix A) length of 
tenure had to be collapsed into no more than three categories. To do that the tenure 
frequency distribution was divided into three almost equal categories with about a 
third of the respondents in each (26, 20, 23 respectively), yielding the above grouping. 
62 These categories were collapsed together to avoid empty cells or cells with very small 








To a small extent 30.8 30 30.4 
Partially 42.3 50 21.7 
Substantially 26.9 20 47.8 
Total N=69 (N=26) 100% (N=20) 100% (N=23) 100% 
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practically no differences in perceived leniency between judges of short and 
medium tenure, judges with long tenure perceived punishment as much more 
lenient.63 Nearly a half (48 percent) of the more experienced judges (14 years 
and more) assessed punishment as at least substantially lenient; about a third 
(30 percent) perceived it as lenient to a small extent (none said it was not 
lenient at all). In contrast, the shorter tenured judges (0-7 and 8-13 years' 
tenure), 20 percent and 27 percent, respectively assessed punishment as 
substantially lenient and 42 percent and 50 percent assessed punishment as 
partially lenient. In addition, it is interesting to see that the assessments of 
punishment as not lenient (or to a small extent only) were unrelated to years 
of experience: slightly less than a third of the judges, regardless of experience, 
assessed punishment as not lenient (30, 30, and 31 percent). The distribution 
of responses in the other categories (partly, considerably, and very lenient) 
did vary by experience. Thus, the results suggested that experience as judge 
and punishment assessment, are related in a slightly non-linear relationship.64 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the hypothesis that tenure is related to 
punishment assessment of judges, is supported. The results suggest, however, 
that experience had a differential effect on judges' evaluations: it made no 
difference for judges who assessed punishment as not lenient, but many years 
of experience did make a difference for the perception of punishment as 
considerably or very lenient. 
3. Judges' Assessments of Punishment by Previous Employment 
It has been proposed that judges who prior to their nomination to the bench 
were employed in the Ministry of Justice (e.g., Public Prosecution Office) 
would assess the level of punishment as more lenient than judges who were 
previously employed in the private sector.65 Of interest here were judges who, 
                                                 
63 χ2 =14.9, d.f.=8; Sig=0.06. N=69. The significance test here shows that the differences 
observed here are not statistically significant at the p=0.05 level. However, given the 
small numbers of judges, one can adopt here the less-conservative approach, where 
significance can be accepted at the p<0.10 level. Hence, we consider these differences 
as significant. 
64 This may explain the low correlation coefficient observed above. 
65 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439 (7th. Cir.1995), Judge Posner, 'Former prosecutors may 
have a different bent from former defense lawyers, former lawyers for tort plaintiffs a 
different bent from former lawyers for insurance companies'. 
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before being nominated to the bench, served as defence lawyers as 
distinguished from those who served as prosecutors. The argument is that 
judges who served as prosecutors will tend to assess the level of punishment 
as more lenient than those who served as defence lawyers.  
The best proxy we had for previous employment was previous employment 
in the private sector (e.g., private law firms) or previous employment in the 
government sector (e.g., Public Prosecution Office, Ministry of Justice). We 
adopted these two categories in order to test the relationship between 
previous employment and perceived punishment. The distributions of 
punishment assessments within each employment group were compared.66 
The results, however, did not support this proposition: no significant 
differences were found between the responses based on previous 
employment.67  
4. Judges' Assessments of Punishment by Gender 
Does the perception of punishment relate to the gender of the judge? 
Previous research provided mixed results on this issue.68 Some scholars 
viewed female judges as more 'liberal,' and as more lenient in punishment.69 
Given the ambiguous results of various studies, we examined in our data 
whether gender was related or not to the judges' perceptions of severity of 
punishment.70 The results suggested that there were no statistically 
                                                 
66 The original response range of six possible responses of this distribution had to be 
clustered into three main categories to avoid categories with very small numbers of 
responses or 'empty' ones. 'Partly' and 'considerable extent' were joined into 'partly' 
and 'a large' and 'very large extents' were joined into 'large extent'. However, there 
was no significant difference (χ2 test) between these distributions when the full 
distribution was examined. 
67 χ2= 1.65, d.f.=4, p= 0.80 n.s.; N=77 
68 See for example, Shanna R. Van Slyke & William D. Bales, 'Gender Dynamics in the 
Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders' (2013) 26 Criminal Justice Studies 168-196; 
but, see to the contrary, Barbara Palmer, 'Women in the American Judiciary: Their 
Influence and Impact' (2001) 23 Women & Politics 89–99. 
69 Joanne Belknap, The Invisible Woman: Gender, Crime, and Justice (Cengage Learning 
2014) 566.  
70 To examine it, judges were grouped by gender and the distributions of respondents' 
assessments of the level of punishment were compared. 
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significant differences between female and male judges in this matter.71 Both 
male and female judges similarly assessed the prevalent level of punishment 
severity. 
5. Multivariate Analyses 
So far, we have examined the relationships between judges' assessment of 
punishment and some background factors. However, in reality, the effect of 
each of the background factors on the judges' evaluations is not isolated from 
the possible effects of the others. To wit, when combined, the effect of each 
of these factors on the assessment may overlap or be different than their 
singular effect. Hence, the joint effect of these factors on the assessment and 
their relative weights ought to be analyzed as well. A multivariate analysis 
was, therefore, required. This was done by regressing the judges' assessments 
of punishment on the three major background factors.72 
The regression analysis suggested that the tenure as judge and the instance in 
which they presided were predictors of the variance in punishment 
assessments (Table 3). Gender was found to have no significant independent 
effect. These two variables accounted for nine percent of the adjusted 
variance in severity assessment, a rather low explained variance. 


















Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) b 2.486 .465  5.340 .000   
Years as judge   .049 .016 .40 3.001 .004 .752 1.329 
 Gender    .153 .243 .074    .629 .532 .967 1.034 
 District Court  .578 .263      .29 2.198 .032 .773 1.293 
a) Dependent Variable: Sentences reflect a lenient approach 
b) Predictors: (Constant), Gender, First/Second Instance, Tenure (Years) as judge 
R2 = 0.13, Adj. R2= 0.09 
                                                 
71 χ2 = 3.19, d.f. =4, p= 0.53, n.s. 
72 Given the small number of judges, only three independent variables could be used in 
the analyses to attain valid results. Using more than three predictors here could have 
distorted the regression analysis. 
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ANOVAa 
Model 1 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 9.020 3 3.01 3.26 .027 
Residual           59.965        65   .923   
Total 68.986 68    
a) Dependent Variable: Sentences reflect a lenient approach 
Two comments need to be made here. First, the rather small proportion of 
variance might be due to the small variance in the dependent variable. As can 
be seen in Chart 1, there was a small variance in the judges' responses to this 
question: 83 percent of the responses were concentrated in three of the six 
response categories. This small variance may be a reason for the small 
variance explained by the model analyzed here. The relatively small number 
of respondents may also be a contributing factor. 
Second, there were some other variables not measured in our survey that 
might have had an impact on the way judges evaluate the severity of prevalent 
punishment. Therefore, the three variables in the model here cannot have 
been expected to account for the large portion of the variance. Future 
research ought to explore for other variables and examine the effect on 
judges' assessment the level of punishment. 
Given the abovementioned limitations, rather than focusing on the total 
percentage of variance accounted for by the model, we suggest focusing on 
the relative weights or relative importance of the variables in the model (β 
weights)73 in accounting for the variance in responses. From this perspective, 
the tenure as a judge (β = 0.40) appeared to be the main predictor related to 
punishment assessment, suggesting that the longer the years as a judge, the 
more lenient the assessment of punishment is. The second predictor was 
court instance (β = 0.29) in which the second instance judges saw the 
punishment as more lenient than the first instance ones. The third factor, 
gender, was not found here to have any net effect at all on the assessments. 
                                                 
73 β is a standardized regression coefficient (i.e., coefficient expressed in standard score) 
that reflects the net weight of each variable (accounting for that of the others) in the 
regression formula. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The main finding of this study is that the judges viewed the general level of 
sentencing as consistently lenient. This is surprising since one would expect 
that judges, who are the ones making the penalty decision, would view the 
courts' punishment as appropriate, not as considerably lenient. Moreover, 
our findings showed that the judges' perception of the leniency of criminal 
punishment was not just an isolated phenomenon. It was a consistent 
assessment. Over three consecutive surveys, each taken a decade apart, the 
Israeli judges repeatedly indicated that they regard the courts' sentencing as 
lenient. 
These findings suggest that the courts system has no effective regulatory or 
internal control mechanisms to adjust or 'correct' the level of sentencing. 
Adjustments or corrections were not found even when extended over a long 
period of time, a finding that is quite surprising. To wit, the courts' system 
lacked (or failed to effectively maintain) an inherent control mechanism 
(homeostasis). The absence of such mechanisms calls for the introduction of 
regulatory homeostatic 'safe-guards,' either internal or external. Without 
such regulatory mechanisms, the level of punishment issued by the courts 
may diverge from the 'appropriate' sentencing level. 
Furthermore, the results suggested that the judges themselves did not take 
action to adjust the level of sentences they believed to be too lenient. They 
were the agents who determined the punishment and its level and had the 
discretion to change it. They could have served as an 'adjusting mechanism' 
by issuing sentences that were more in line with what they themselves 
consider 'appropriate' punishment. i.e., issue more severe sentences when 
they perceive the general level of punishment to be lenient. Similarly, they 
could have issued sentences that were more lenient when they perceived the 
level of punishment to be overly severe. However, the findings here indicated 
that this was not done. It appears as if the judges consistently acted contrary 
to their own judgment: lenient sentences were issued while simultaneously 
assessing the general level of punishment to be considerably lenient. 
Why would judges be reluctant to adjust their sentencing level to what they 
think is right? One possible answer to this question may be found in Posner's 
question: 'What do judges maximize? (The same thing as everybody else 
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does)'74 i.e. their own interests. Indeed, in a previous study we conducted that 
considerations of personal reputation might affect judicial behaviour.75 Given 
this, we propose that although judges have the formal and structural 
independence to issue the 'appropriate' punishments, a judge's personal 
consideration of his reputation may underlie his reluctance to take action 
toward correcting lenient punishment. 
In Israel, as in many other Western democracies, judges are given discretion 
and independence to make judgments as they see fit (within the law), free of 
external pressures. They are legally and structurally insulated from 
extraneous considerations and influences and are bounded only by the letter 
of the law. It is the judges' duty to impose appropriate punishment. What 
could drive judges to impose lenient sentences? Judges, as does 'everybody 
else,' may have their own interests in mind. For example, they may have an 
aversion to being overruled and reversed. Such reversals may damage the 
reputation as a competent judge.76 Lenient (but not too lenient) sentences 
appear to be the best strategy for judges to minimize reversals. In general, the 
probability of the defendants appealing a decision is substantially higher than 
that of an appeal by the prosecution (the State). A judge can quite easily 
decrease the probability of reversal by imposing lenient sentences (but not 
too lenient). The probability of appeal under such a leniency policy will be 
diminished because the defendant may be reluctant to appeal fearing a 
harsher sentence, and the prosecution (given the punishment is not too 
lenient) may be reluctant to allocate the time and resources involved in an 
appeal, once a guilty verdict has been attained. Consequently, the probability 
of reversals is minimized, and with it, the probability of damaging the judge's 
reputation.77 Hence, an optimal strategy for a judge to avoid reversal is to 
                                                 
74 Richard A. Posner, 'What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does)' (1993) 3 Supreme Court Economic Review 1-41. 
75 Moshe Bar Niv (Burnovski), Ran Lachman, 'Self-Interest in Judges' Time Allocation 
for Writing Judgments' SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641376, or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641376 accessed 16 July 2010. 
76 See, Christopher R. Drahozal, 'Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process' (1998) 51 
Southern Methodist University Law Rev. 469-503. 
77 Various studies claim that judges are influenced by the fear of reversal, see for 
example, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner,'What Do Federal 
District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals' (2012) 
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impose lenient penalties. Since this was not the focus of our studies, we have 
no current data to test this proposition. Further research is required in order 
to find an answer to this puzzling issue. 
The leniency of punishment, as reflected by the judges' assessments over 
decades, ought to be a source of concern for the system. Such a continuously 
lenient level of punishment is likely to have a considerable impact on the 
behaviour of the various stakeholders in the justice system. Potential 
offenders, as well as potential victims of crime, may react to it by developing 
socially undesirable patterns of behaviour. If left unobserved and 
uncorrected, such a trend may result with grave consequences such as erosion 
of the public trust in the judicial system. Such erosion might undermine the 
whole system of judgement's foundations and legitimization. 
                                                 
28 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 518-549; David E Klein, Robert J. 
Hume, 'Fear of reversal as an explanation of lower court compliance' (2003) 37 Law & 
Society Review 579-581. 
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APPENDIX  
1. The Research Method 
This study was a longitudinal study that examined, over a period of almost 
three decades, the perceptions of Israeli courts judges regarding the severity 
of punishment issued by Israeli courts. The study was based on the analyses 
of data collected in three consecutive surveys, conducted a decade apart in 
1989, 1999 and 2010, among the judges presiding in first and second instance 
courts in Israel. In each survey, self-administered mail-questionnaires were 
sent to all the presiding judges in the first and second instance courts 
(Supreme Court judges were not included). 
The three surveys included questions on a variety of issues and opinions 
related to work of the judges and the functioning of the judicial system. These 
were outside the scope of the present study. In all three surveys, however, the 
very same question was asked regarding their assessment of the level of 
punishment. The identical question allowed comparison of the judges' 
responses across the time period of nearly three decades. 
The self-administered questionnaires were anonymous and the 
confidentiality of respondents' answers was promised. Judges were asked to 
fill the questionnaire and mail it back to the researchers in a pre-addressed 
and stamped envelope. 
2. Survey Procedure 
Prior to conducting the surveys, exploratory studies were conducted to 
investigate the phenomena we intended to study and find out the judges' 
views on these issues. These studies included a literature review as well as a 
number of in-depth interviews with judges (mostly retired judges or judges 
who had voluntarily left the bench before retiring) to get their perspective on 
the issues at hand. Based on these interviews, a first draft of the survey 
questionnaire was constructed. The draft was pre-tested by several (ex-) 
judges and their comments on it were integrated into a final draft of the 
questionnaire. To allow for over time comparisons, the questionnaires of the 
three surveys were largely identical except for one part in them relating to 
issues that were topical at the time of the respective surveys. 
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To each of the judges who were included in the survey, a personally addressed 
envelope was sent containing the questionnaire, the approval by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court to distribute the questionnaire, and a stamped 
envelope with a return address. Since the private addresses of judges in Israel 
are confidential, questionnaires were sent to the judges by mail to their 
courts. Since the questionnaires were anonymous and the envelopes were not 
marked and had no signs identifying the sender, it was impossible to know 
who sent back his or her questionnaire or what a given judge answered. Hence 
each time, two weeks after the survey was sent out, a reminder was sent to all 
judges, emphasizing that those who had responded should not respond again. 
49, 65 and 86 judges (respective to the surveys) sent back completed and 
usable questionnaires (see below). 
3. The Respondents 
The study populations were all the judges in Israel who presided in first and 
second instance courts at the time of the respective survey (not including the 
Supreme Court, Labour Court, Juvenile Court, etc.). When the first and the 
second surveys were conducted (1989 and 1999) 320 judges in total served in 
the first and second instance courts in Israel. The total number of judges at 
the time the third survey was conducted (2010) had increased to 528 judges.78 
Our aim was to survey the entire population of judges, not just a sample of 
them. Thus, each of the three survey questionnaires was sent to all judges in 
Israel. However, as would be expected, not everyone responded to the 
questionnaire. Consequently, the resultant sample was obtained of those who 
were kind enough to respond and send the questionnaire back to us: 49 in 
1989, 65 in 1999 and 86 in 2010. 
As these respondents do not constitute probability samples, each was 
examined to see if they represented the judges' population at the time. The 
characteristics of the respondents in each sample were compared to the 
overall characteristics of the judges' population. In all three samples, no 
statistically significant differences were found. In other words, the samples 
appeared to represent the population of judges in Israel well. Further, we 
tested whether the samples obtained were compatible with each other. We 
                                                 
78 The number of judicial positions has increased in response to a shortage of judges in 
Israel. 
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compared a few characteristics of the responding judges in the three samples. 
For example, the average tenure in the legal profession and years in office (as 
a judge), were found to be similar (no significant differences) in the three 
samples. In the 1989 sample, the average tenure of the judges in the 
profession was 22.5 years, while it was 26.4 years in the 2010 sample. The 
average number of years in office as a judge was 9.9 years in the 1989 sample, 
compared to an average of 9.6 years in the 1999 survey and 11.6 years in the 
2010 survey. To wit, over time, the three samples of judges were not different 
from each other. It appears, therefore, that the three samples (a decade apart) 
were compatible with each other as well as representative of the judge 
population in Israel. 
Although representative of their respective populations (which were small to 
begin with) the absolute numbers of respondents in the 1989, 1999, and 2010 
samples were rather small (49, 65 and 86, respectively). Hence, it cannot be 
concluded with high confidence from the findings that such conclusions 
unequivocally apply to all judges. Nevertheless, since surveys in which the 
judges themselves answer the questionnaires concerning their work are 
extremely scarce, we found it important to present the findings and treat 
them as indicating general trends and suggestive of possible implications. 
4. Possible Response Biases 
The small number of respondents relative to the population size could raise 
concerns that a self-selection bias may exist: i.e., respondents decide whether 
or not to respond to the questionnaire based on their interest (or disinterest) 
in the study topic. Consequently, the sample might not be random but biased 
by the judges' views on the research topic.79 However, such a bias is not very 
likely in these surveys: the questionnaires included a large number of topics 
about the legal profession (such as the very large increase in the number of 
lawyers in Israel between 199 and 2010, and its implications for the 
profession), judicial (judging processes, decision making, etc.), the 
functioning of the judicial system, and more. It is unlikely that judges would 
pick out one question (the evaluation of the severity of prevalent courts' 
punishment) to decide based on it whether to continue filling it out or not. 
Secondly, as indicated above, other characteristics of the judges in the 
                                                 
79 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Cengage Learning 2011). 
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samples (e.g., distribution to districts, gender, etc.) were similar to their 
distributions in the judges' populations as a whole in Israel. Thirdly, we have 
interviewed several judges about their willingness to respond to the 
questionnaire, and these interviews showed that lack of time and work-
overload were the main reasons for not answering the detailed questionnaire. 
Given all this, we suggest that there was no significant self-selection bias on 
the samples. 
5. Measuring the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in our study was the judges' perception of the severity 
of the courts' punishment. This was measured by a question asking the judges 
(in all three surveys) to respond to the following statement: 'Given your 
familiarity with the Israeli court system, would you say the punishments 
issued in Israel generally reflect a lenient approach?' The response range was: 
1. Not at all; 2. To a small extent only; 3. Partially so; 4. To a considerable 
extent; 5. To a large extent; 6. To a very large extent. A few points should be 
made regarding the question and the choice of response range. 
In order to assess the judges' evaluation of punishment, a single, straight-
forward question was used. Given the application of a self-administered 
survey method, the questionnaire had to be as succinct as possible in order 
not to put-off the respondents. This is common practice in public opinion 
polls and attitude-surveys where no face-to-face interview is held.80 This 
practice is even more pronounced when respondents are highly professional 
and very sensitive to time pressures, such as was our case with the judges. In 
the pre-tests we conducted, the question regarding leniency was tested, and 
the judges participating in the pre-test indicated that the question was quite 
clear. 
A second point is the definition of 'lenient'. Since perceived 'leniency' is an 
individual evaluation ('in the eyes of the beholder', so to speak), it had to be 
left to the individual judge to decide what he/she considered to be lenient and 
to what extent. Defining it for the respondent would entail 'imposing' the 
researchers' definition on the respondents and, therefore, is seldom 
                                                 
80 E.g., Frederick J Gravetter, Lori-Ann B. Forzano, Research Methods for the Behavioral 
Sciences, (Wadsworth Publishing 3rd edn, 2009). 
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recommended in cases like ours. Furthermore, by law, judges are given the 
discretion to determine what the adequate punishment is for a given case 
(except for the few offenses where a mandatory punishment is determined in 
the law). Judges are trusted to use their best judgment. Hence, it is up to them 
to determine what level of punishment is 'inadequate' and to what extent. 
Also, they are human, so they act according to their own perceptions and, 
therefore, it is important to assess these perceptions. Given these 
considerations, the question presented asked them to assess whether the 
extent the punishments issued in Israel generally reflect a lenient approach 
not according to a pre-determined 'objective yardstick' but given their 
familiarity with the Israeli court system. 
The response range chosen appears to overemphasize the leniency of 
punishment, because it is not 'symmetrical' in the response options (i.e., not 
symmetrical between 'lenient to a very large extent' on the one end and 
'severe to a very large extent' on the other). The response range in our study 
was not symmetrical as it offered several response options regarding leniency 
and only a single answer of 'not at all lenient', and had no reference to the 
possibility that the punishments were harsh. We chose to regard the 
anticipated distribution of answers to this question to be skewed to the side 
of leniency. In the literature review preceding the study, we had found that 
all the previous polls and studies found that only a small percentage of the 
public evaluated punishment as harsh; the vast majority of respondents 
indicated that the punishments were lenient.  
Furthermore, in preliminary interviews we conducted with judges and 
lawyers, the interviewees overwhelmingly stated that the punishment was too 
lenient, with not even one suggesting that it was too severe. In addition, the 
preliminary results of the pre-test study showed that the respondents did not 
select the response of 'severe punishment'. Hence, this response alternative 
was omitted. Designing the frequently used 'symmetric' response range for 
this question would have distorted the skewed nature of the response 
distribution.81 
Our preference was to create a scale more sensitive to tapping differences on 
the side of the more frequent response in order to better distinguish between 
                                                 
81 ibid. 
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various dimensions of leniency. A symmetric range or scale of, for example, 
five possible answers, ranging from: 1. very lenient to 5, very harsh, would have 
meant allocating two response options on the severe side of the range, two on 
the lenient side, and one middle or neutral option. In cases such as the present 
one, most responses would have been given on the too 'lenient' side of the 
scale with few if any responses on the two options allocated to the severe side 
of the scale. Two response options are not a sensitive enough scale to 
differentiate perceptions within the 'lenient' side. At the same time, the two 
'harsh' punishment responses would have been left with almost no response. 
A concrete example of this situation can be seen in the findings of a study 
conducted in England, shown in Table 1 above. There, interviewees were 
presented a symmetrical response-scale ranging between strict and lenient 
punishment, and the results showed that in three consecutive surveys only 
three percent (combined) of the respondents responded to the two options 
of 'strict' and 'very strict' punishment. In contrast, three-quarters of 
responses were concentrated on the two 'lenient' options. Given such results, 
it is: a. not possible to get a fuller range of answers regarding the real 
perceptions; and b. hampers the ability to analyze and better understand the 
assessment of punishment by the public. Indeed, the actual distribution of 
responses found and reported here (for example, Chart 1) is concentrated on 
the 'lenient' side of the scale while there were very few that answers of 'not at 
all lenient.' Thus, it supports our preference of the asymmetric response 
range over the symmetric one. 
